Mills: Let's talk a little bit about the psychological factors that motivate people to believe in conspiracy theories. I know you've laid out in your research three areas that you call epistemic, existential and social motives. Can you explain what they are, what those terms mean?
Douglas: Yes, of course. We argue that people are drawn to conspiracy theories in order to satisfy or in an attempt to satisfy three important psychological motives. The first of these motives are epistemic motives. I guess in a nutshell, epistemic motives really just refer to the need for knowledge and certainty and I guess the motive or desire to have information. And when something major happens, when a big event happens, people naturally want to know why that happened. They want an explanation and they want to know the truth. But they also want to feel certain of that truth.
And some psychological evidence suggests that people are drawn to conspiracy theories when they do feel uncertain either in specific situations or more generally. And there are other epistemic reasons why people believe in conspiracy theories as well in relation to this sort of need for knowledge and certainty. So people with lower levels of education tend to be drawn to conspiracy theories. And we don't argue that's because people are not intelligent. It's simply that they haven't been allowed to have, or haven't been given access to the tools to allow them to differentiate between good sources and bad sources or credible sources and non-credible sources. So they're looking for that knowledge and certainty, but not necessarily looking in the right places.
The second set of motives, we would call existential motives. And really they just refer to people's needs to be or to feel safe and secure in the world that they live in. And also to feel that they have some kind of power or autonomy over the things that happen to them as well. So again, when something happens, people don't like to feel powerless. They don't like to feel out of control. And so reaching to conspiracy theories might, I guess, at least allow people to feel that they have information that at least explains why they don't have any control over this situation. Research has shown that people who do feel powerless and disillusioned do tend to gravitate more towards conspiracy theories.
The final set of motives we would call social motives and those refer to people's desire to feel good about themselves as individuals and also feel good about themselves in terms of the groups that they belong to. And I guess at the individual level, people like to feel... Well, they like to have high self-esteem. They like to feel good about themselves. And potentially one way of doing that is to feel that you have access to information that other people don't necessarily have.
And this is quite a common rhetorical tool that people use when they talk about conspiracy theories, that everybody else is some kind of sheep, but that they know the truth. They have the truth. And having that kind of belief, I guess, feeling that you're in possession of information that other people don't have, can give you a feeling of superiority over others. And we have found, and others have shown as well that a need for uniqueness and a need to have, I guess, stand out from others is associated with belief in conspiracy theories.
And this happens at the level of the group as well. So people who have an overinflated sense of the importance of the groups that they belong to, but at the same time, the feeling that those groups are underappreciated, those kinds of feelings as well, draw people towards conspiracy theories, especially conspiracy theories about their groups. So in having those sorts of beliefs, you can maintain the idea that your group is good and moral and upstanding, whereas others are the evil doers out there who are trying to ruin it for everybody else.
Those three main motives... Those three psychological motives, the epistemic, existential and social, it's possible to summarize, I guess, the psychological literature on conspiracy theories into those three motivations. So yeah, that's what we argue.
Mills: What role, if any, does narcissism play in belief in conspiracy theories? People who tend to be more narcissistic also believe in these theories as a means of getting the social capital?
Douglas: Yes, absolutely. That is true. And that's kind of what I was referring to. It's linked to the idea of need for uniqueness, as well. That's another, I guess, narcissistic notion that you have. You're in possession of information that other people don't have. You're different to other people and it makes you stand apart. But yes, narcissism at an individual level has been associated in quite a few studies now with belief in conspiracy theories.
And also this narcissism at the group level as well, so an over inflated sense of the importance of your own group. That kind of insecure feeling about your own group is also associated with belief in conspiracy theories. So yes, narcissism is one of those individual differences, variables that correlate with belief in conspiracy theories.
Mills: So a few moments ago, you talked about education level as being a factor. And I'm wondering what about other demographic categories such as age or gender? Do you see any associations between those and tendency to believe in conspiracy theories?
Douglas: Yes. In terms of age, we do. In our research, we generally find that older people believe in conspiracy theories less than younger people do. That tends to show up in most of the studies that we have run. So there's simply a correlation between conspiracy belief and age. That is a negative correlation, so the older you are, the less you believe in conspiracy theories. Or the other way around the younger you are, the more you believe in conspiracy theories. And that does tend to show up pretty much all of the time. In terms of gender, at least in the research that myself and my colleagues have conducted, we've never found any gender differences in terms of conspiracy belief. So as we measure belief in conspiracy theories using these psychological scales, we have never found that men believe more than women or women believe more than men or whatever. We've never found anything like that.
I think one or two studies may have shown gender differences for specific conspiracy theories. I know of a recent study that, and I can't remember which direction it went in actually, but that showed that in terms of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, there was some kind of gender difference. But personally, I've never found that, which I think is very interesting and counter-intuitive in a way. Because if people think about the prototypical conspiracy theorist, again, if you want to use that term to describe people, then they do tend to think of a middle-aged white man, usually. And that may be the case for the prominent conspiracy theorists. Your well-known people who propagate these conspiracy theories, but not necessarily your everyday person who's consuming this information on the internet and deciding whether or not it's true. We don't really find those gender differences there.
Mills: That's really interesting. I mean, because it is when we just had this overrun of the U.S. Capitol here in Washington and it looked like there were a lot of younger and middle-aged men out there. I mean, certainly there were women involved, but that was the sense. And of course that is the conspiracy theory that the Trump election was stolen.
Douglas: Yes. Yeah, that's true. That's extremely interesting. And of course I was watching this on the news as well and thinking very much the same thing. But I think that there probably is a difference in the person who sits at home and reads this information on the internet and then decides whether or not it's true and the individuals who are prepared to actually go and storm a building or to go out and actively cause trouble based on these conspiracy beliefs. So there's probably a lot going on there, but in terms of the way we measure belief in conspiracy theories, we just don't, with these sorts of gender differences that might seem obvious, don't seem to play out really in the research that we do on the everyday population, I suppose.
Mills: Another of your studies found that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others, even when those theories directly contradict each other. So for instance, the more your participants believe that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they also believe that she was murdered. And of course, that doesn't make any sense. Can you help explain that?
Douglas: Yeah, of course. Yes. We feel that is a very interesting finding. Obviously we kind of, I guess, started from the point that in the literature it's often been found that if people believe in one conspiracy theory, then they're likely to believe in others. So in other words, there's something that kind of holds these beliefs together. So we were interested to find out, well, what is this? This underlying belief system or underlying attitude that might mean that these conspiracy beliefs are held at the same time, even if they do contradict one another.
So we set to do these studies, and so we asked participants in these studies to rate the extent to which they agree with different conspiracy theories. One, for example, that Princess Diana was assassinated by the royal family. Another one that she was assassinated by MI5, nothing to do with the royal family or others, also, but crucially, I think, one that she was assassinated and is dead. And another, that she was helped to fake her own death and that she's sort of living it up somewhere on an island having a great time. So basically, it's not possible to be dead and alive at the same time. And also, participants-
Mills: Unlike Schrodinger's cat.
Douglas: Yeah, well, that's it. We thought people would not entertain these two conspiracy theories at the same time, but it turned out that they did, or at least they were prepared to entertain the idea that both of those things might be true.
But we also measured the extent to which people believed in, I guess, an underlying conspiracy theory that something just isn't right. Something's up and something is being covered up. And what we found was that some people did indeed endorse these contradictory conspiracy theories, or again, at least were likely to entertain those two ideas at the same time. But once we also took into account the extent to which they believed that there was just something up, then that relationship actually disappeared. So it was the relationship between the contradictory beliefs was explained by the, I guess, underlying belief that just something is being covered up.
So you can explain why people will entertain these contradictory ideas, because both of those ideas are consistent with the underlying idea that there's just something not quite right. So it's not necessarily to say that they will definitely believe that Princess Diana is dead and at the same time believe that she's still alive, but they'll be happy to entertain the idea that those two things are possible, as long as they also entertain the belief that there was just something that wasn't right about those events.
Mills: Yeah. That helps explain it, at least a little bit. Well, what makes a conspiracy theory catch on and have staying power? Are there certain types of theories that are stickier than others or some that are more enduring? Like the earth is flat has been around since forever. So are there characteristics that make them stickier?
Douglas: That's not something that I've done research on myself, to be honest, but I think it's a fascinating question. It's very true that some conspiracy theories stand the test of time and others just disappear. I think that there must be certain features of conspiracy theories, the ones that last and the ones that don't. I don't personally know exactly what they are, but I guess one thing that tends to be very, very common is that the event is very, very large. The event that is explained by the conspiracy theory is very, very large and important and usually involving something of great political or social significance. A lot of other conspiracy theories that you might come across just sort of disappear. I guess a lot of the time we just don't really know why they don't catch on. But plenty of them do. Yeah. It's a really interesting question.
Mills: It's a line of research for you to pursue.
Douglas: Yeah, yeah. Oh, yeah. There definitely is. Yeah. I think that other researchers have started to ask these sorts of questions, and I have tried myself to, I guess, not taxonomize, but sort of almost, I guess, not even categorize conspiracy theories, but try to isolate some of these features. But it's actually very difficult, because there are so many of them about so many different events.
And you pointed out the flat earth conspiracy theory, which has been around forever but kind of died away for a long time and then in recent years just seems to have gotten popular again, and I do find it quite difficult to explain that. I mean, I have a theory about that conspiracy theory, that just generally people are becoming less trustful of science and scientists at the present time, which is why we might be seeing these sorts of ideas making a bit of a comeback. But yeah, no. I think it's a really, really fascinating question, because it's not that even though some of them disappear, they go away, but then they come back again or come back again in a different form or certain conspiracy theories about particular things, like say anti-vaccine or health-related conspiracy theories can kind of reinvent themselves for new things that happen, like 5G conspiracy theories about people getting sick from [inaudible 00:25:10] masks and things like that.
So these sorts of conspiracy theories have always been there. They kind of mutate, I suppose, if you like. They change. But yeah, I think it is a really fascinating question and one that I can't, as a social psychologist, can't really answer very well, unfortunately.
Mills: Is there any way to effectively debunk a conspiracy theory once it's out there? I mean, can you just present the facts? Like you talked about the anti-vaxxers, the fact that the Lancet article that led to a lot of beliefs that children were becoming autistic as a result of vaccines. And then it turned out that that article was bogus. It was based on faulty data and it was retracted, and yet some people are still hanging on to that. So is there a way to stop these theories from continuing to swirl?
Douglas: Yes. There are ways to do this, but of course, it's extremely challenging. It's very, very difficult. Once these conspiracy theories are out there and people believe them, then sometimes people can very, very strongly hold on to these beliefs and defend them very, very strongly as well. And once these attitudes are very, very strong, of course, from other areas of psychology we know that attitudes that are very strongly held are difficult to dispute, I guess. Difficult to change. It's very difficult to change these sorts of attitudes.
And so, yes, it is a challenge, but there are things that that can be done. And a lot of research that, especially in very, very recent years as well, has started to come out in terms of how do you address misinformation? How do you address conspiracy theories? And giving people the facts does work under certain situations. In some of our own research, we've actually found that it's quite effective to provide people with factual information, provide people with the facts. And this was particularly about vaccines before they're exposed to conspiracy theories, and then the conspiracy theory fails to gain traction. But once the people have been exposed to the conspiracy theory, they're giving them the, I guess,... Sorry, the appropriate or correct information afterwards doesn't really work. So, others have taken this information and have started to look at ways to inoculate people against misinformation and to inoculate people against conspiracy theories and fake news and all sorts of other things, which seems to be working as well. So, in other words, you give people either the correct information or some piece of weak misinformation before they're exposed to the worst of it, then that helps them to be able to resist it.
There are other techniques that people have used, that researchers have used, as well, and just to give you one other example, some researchers have looked at the idea of presenting people with a pre-warning or a forewarning that they might be exposed to misinformation. And if people believe that information that they might receive could be misleading, and they have that information up front, then that can sometimes help them to resist the misinformation as well. Now, I think these are all really, really valuable tools, but of course, sometimes the misinformation is all ready out there so it's difficult to get to people beforehand. So, then, you have to resort to, I guess, traditional debunking techniques, such as going in with consistent, strong counter arguments.
But I think that these other techniques provide real opportunities to help people to resist conspiracy theories in general that they might come across in the future. So, if you give people these sorts of, I guess, ways to critically think about information and think, "Well, okay, I could be exposed to misinformation. That misinformation is out there, so I'm going to be on the lookout for it," then it might actually help people to resist it when they come across it next time. If that makes sense.
Mills: Yeah. It sounds like the techniques that they're trying to use right now with the COVID-19 vaccines, telling people up front that if you happen to be particularly allergic, you might have a reaction. This is what to expect. And yet, it's like a game of whack-a-mole because they talk about all of this and they're trying to be as transparent as possible, and yet, along comes somebody who says that the mRNA that's involved in this is actually going to change the DNA in your body. How do you fight that?
Douglas: Yeah. It is very, very difficult, and there are new conspiracy theories all the time. It is exactly like that game. You've got one and then you're constantly trying to hit another one away. It is very, very challenging. There's a lot out there, a lot going on out there.
Mills: And of course, this is all complicated by the fact that sometimes conspiracies do exist and sometimes people may have deep-seated, valid reasons to distrust authority. So, for example, public opinion polls have found that Black Americans are less likely to say they'll take the COVID vaccine and more wary of its safety because they have a long history of being abused and mistreated by the medical establishment. So, is there a way for people to balance this awareness with a healthy skepticism of conspiracy theories?
Douglas: Yes. Again, this is extremely challenging, and you're absolutely right, that some people have very good reasons to be suspicious of these sorts of things because of past events. And so, the challenge becomes even greater. And I don't know the solution to this, apart from the fact that people who are attempting to fight the misinformation will need to be sensitive to these concerns and perhaps be more targeted in their efforts to debunk misinformation, being sensitive to these historical events as well.
So, it can't necessarily be a one size fits all approach to misinformation, just can't be because everybody's circumstances are different, and we know that different communities feel differently about vaccines and various other things as well, for very good reasons. So, that, of course, is a huge challenge for anybody trying to deal with potential misinformation about vaccines and other things, but also, yeah, particularly with COVID, a reluctance to take the vaccine.
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