Work in progress. The next big thing you'll see is the drive for raw materials: metals principally. This will involve the re-opening of some mines in Sweden that were mothballed to be ready for such an occasion (27 of them).
The end?
- Thread starter borolad259
- Start date
Work in progress. The next big thing you'll see is the drive for raw materials: metals principally. This will involve the re-opening of some mines in Sweden that were mothballed to be ready for such an occasion (27 of them).
I'm wondering if there wasn't a typo in my mates message about that number.
Ingleby_Flash
Well-known member
Got to be, 80 would be a result.
I will check but, as he's back in HQ for the weekend, Might not be tonight.
Well as "The allocation of €58 billion of total defence expenditure to defence investment by the 27 EU Member States marks a robust growth of 5.9%" back in November, I think there's a decimal point missing
EU defence spending Nov 2023
Well as "The allocation of €58 billion of total defence expenditure to defence investment by the 27 EU Member States marks a robust growth of 5.9%" back in November, I think there's a decimal point missing
The Eu wasn't going to war with Russia back then mind.
True, and looking elsewhere it puts the whole EU budget at 295 billion EUR so that figure isn't impossible
Defender 4x4
Well-known member
Orban on which side of the fence does he sit ? To me he sits to far to the the Russian side. He wants everything the West can offer, Then takes every thing that Putin offers. Macron needs to ask some pointed questions, as Sunak has not got the balls.
Tryasize10
Well-known member
I just don't get why most things posted on here are positive in terms of the situation for Ukraine but everything else I read and hear on various channels is the exact opposite?
Things are really hard for Ukraine actually. It's not much fun having civilians targeted by missiles and drones. And the fighting on the front line is extremely hard too. The fact that they have not been vanquished by an aggressive, heavily armed neighbouring super-power after over two years is a victory in itself. Militarily speaking though, they are incurring significantly less in losses (ships, fighter/bombers, helicopters, tanks, etc) than Russia. And you will have heard about those. That eventually takes its toll. As does the gradual degradation of Russia's oil refining capacity ... which is not only essential for their war effort (vehicle fuel), it also underpins the entire economy. The trajectories of the two sides are in the opposite direction. Russia has less and less hardware, is getting fewer shells and other ordnance, is having to rely on older and older heavy equipment (tanks from the 1950s) and is suffering gradual economic decline. They have few friends. Ukraine on the other hand is getting incrementally more equipment, better and more modern gear and increasing financial support from friends who are growing more steadfast in their backing. They have recieved a huge number of shells from the Chinese this last week for instance. And the support of the EU just became a whole lot more full blooded.
But it's not over, and you will continue to read stories about setbacks. It's war. But it's only heading one way ... albeit not as quickly as most of us would like.
Decent_Left
Well-known member
I think the only thing sunk from a Ruzzian perspective is the Black Sea Fleet and a fair chunk of their Air Force
Decent_Left
Well-known member
My view only is that the nature of the western media and think tanks is that they are reporting only whats visible and whats visible is land capture and interviews with the good guys who are going through hell and of course are tired and fed up and wish it was all over.
On this thread we get an insider view of for example not just a pretty picture of a drone strike on an oil refinery but an estimate of the impact in termes of refinery production reduction, the income loss to the klepto state of this reduction, along with a perspective what it means for the musical chairs in the internal power balance including these chairs being chucked out of a window with some sap still sat on it.
Have said it before but Ruzzia has militarily lost right now (excluding a nuclear scenario when we all lose), but as it stands UKR can actually win (restoration of full control within its sovereign borders) either in the long term with current levels of support or shorter term if the west - specifically Europe - ups its game.
The usual comparisons to WW2 and Germany having lost from the moment they declared war on the USA, but it still took another 3 and half years for that to end. Further back think of the Penninsula campaign. How many British regiments have Talavera as a battle honour. What happend next is Wellesley headed back into Portugal and that rhythm continued for another 5 years, but each year in between the French had become weaker.
Its that perspective - taking all the emotion of human sacrifice out of it - that makes me optimistic.
Ukraine is in this for the long haul, its up to us in the West not to get tired of it first.
On the subect of refineries:
"With tonights two oil refineries blown up Russia is now officially in a state of "Down **** Creek" as fuels are concerned.
Russia is now desperately trying to purchase refined oil products on the open market, and via less open sources on the black market.
It is going very "soso" for them.
The purchasing of refined products is obviously increasing their burn rate of cash on hand tremendously.
Previously they had an income from this stuff that paid for things, now they have to pay for it instead.
And we are definitely now at the point where Russia will have to pull the handbrake and start rationing fuel to civilians, price hiking just will not cut it any longer to lower consumtion inside of Russia.
Next step would obviously be rationing the non-essential industry of Russia.
Obviously the Russian army will for now at least have enough fuel, the same goes for the wartime industrial production.
But, all of those non-essential industries, and civilians not driving, will lower the productivity of the Russian society significantly over time.
And, the question still remain on what the heck they are gonna do with their agro-industrial complex.
If they do not prioritise that one Russia will have a Holodomor of their own come winter, and quite frankly I don't think that they will have enough fuel for that industry on top of the army and the wartime production.
At least this will be the case if more refining capacity is taken out of commission, and that will happen.
I am here thinking about how Russia is normally described:
"Russia is gas-station with nukes"
"Russia is a country filled with beautiful women and cheap gas"
Or, like someone quipped: "Russia is a country filled with cheap women and beautiful gas".
Due to nobody even thinking that Russia would run out of fuel, there is a glaring hole in the sanctions against Russia.
We need to sanction Russian fuel purchases from now on to speed up the process of societal breakdown.
I have made a mental note about this in capital letter inked red in my head for my next jaunt to EU/NATO/JEDI, and I have already emailed a few to try to get those wheels started.
Pubic Presidential Erection of Russia
We are now on day two of three of the sham elections.
Yesterday was filled with women burning up voting booths and inking ballot boxes, it will be interesting to follow what those industrial women do today.
Things are definitely normal and well with a country where people show up to burn down the election sites with molotov cocktails."
"With tonights two oil refineries blown up Russia is now officially in a state of "Down **** Creek" as fuels are concerned.
Russia is now desperately trying to purchase refined oil products on the open market, and via less open sources on the black market.
It is going very "soso" for them.
The purchasing of refined products is obviously increasing their burn rate of cash on hand tremendously.
Previously they had an income from this stuff that paid for things, now they have to pay for it instead.
And we are definitely now at the point where Russia will have to pull the handbrake and start rationing fuel to civilians, price hiking just will not cut it any longer to lower consumtion inside of Russia.
Next step would obviously be rationing the non-essential industry of Russia.
Obviously the Russian army will for now at least have enough fuel, the same goes for the wartime industrial production.
But, all of those non-essential industries, and civilians not driving, will lower the productivity of the Russian society significantly over time.
And, the question still remain on what the heck they are gonna do with their agro-industrial complex.
If they do not prioritise that one Russia will have a Holodomor of their own come winter, and quite frankly I don't think that they will have enough fuel for that industry on top of the army and the wartime production.
At least this will be the case if more refining capacity is taken out of commission, and that will happen.
I am here thinking about how Russia is normally described:
"Russia is gas-station with nukes"
"Russia is a country filled with beautiful women and cheap gas"
Or, like someone quipped: "Russia is a country filled with cheap women and beautiful gas".
Due to nobody even thinking that Russia would run out of fuel, there is a glaring hole in the sanctions against Russia.
We need to sanction Russian fuel purchases from now on to speed up the process of societal breakdown.
I have made a mental note about this in capital letter inked red in my head for my next jaunt to EU/NATO/JEDI, and I have already emailed a few to try to get those wheels started.
Pubic Presidential Erection of Russia
We are now on day two of three of the sham elections.
Yesterday was filled with women burning up voting booths and inking ballot boxes, it will be interesting to follow what those industrial women do today.
Things are definitely normal and well with a country where people show up to burn down the election sites with molotov cocktails."
Ian Bairds Ears
Well-known member
Cheers boro Lad brilliantly simple synopsis which i do appreciate when tuning in here
Bits and bobs
"Disparity
If anything the number of killed Russians have gone up somewhat post Avdivka, just a few percent, but the trend is slowly upwards.
At the time we see a slow creep downwards in the number of destroyed tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery.
The interesting difference is that we see a slow creep upwards in the numbers of destroyed other vehicles.
So, what is going on?
Let us start at the end.
Russia is now using the Chinese unarmoured "golf-carts" that they bought in their thousands.
Obviously these are not military vehicles in any aspect of the modern meaning of it, instead these used to be sold in vibrant colours to gardening companies and to cemetaries and so on.
They are not made for the rigors of the behind of a battlefield, and when used in the actual frontline they quickly suffer from Rigor Mortis.
But Russia will use anything in their attempts to make progress.
It is though good to remember that they are so unarmoured that they lack doors and windshields.
Beside this they are using 4-wheel mini-thingies, that variety that is famous for tipping over and crushing their owners.
And this is sprinkled in with Ladas rampacked with soldiers driving like crazy towards the Ukrainians.
We are still seeing tanks and armoured vehicles, but the columns are now gone or smaller, instead they use one or two tanks and a couple of armoured vehicles during attacks, interspersed with the more "unusual stuff".
At the same time Russia is using more soldiers in each attack, complete with suicide squads running infront of the vehicles and armour.
Troops who's only job is to try to clear mines and to defend the armour and vehicles.
If these are attacked the vehicles and armour normally now attempt an about turn.
Another goal of the suicide troops are to draw in the FPV attack drones and deplete them, but since these are accompanied by surveillance drones, the Ukrainian troops are rarely duped by this.
At the same time Russia has made changes to the locationing of their artillery, they now have it in 3 lines that are thinner.
The forwardmost is designed to try to fire on Ukrainian artillery and villages.
The mediumline is designed to fire on the Ukrainian lines, and is meant to be somewhat safe from Ukrainian artillery, but due to the disparity in range this is not true.
The rear line is there to answer if there is a Ukrainian breakthrough, or as a ready reserve, Russians believe these are safe from drones and artillery, but they are not safe from GLSDBs and the new longer ranged drones appearing on the battlefield.
Now, let us talk about the why.
Normally if you see a drop in equipment losses you would expect a similar corresponding drop in troop losses.
This would be a sign of a decrease in offensive operations, or correspondingly a drop in your own offencive operations.
But, that is not the case on either side.
Next reason would be that you are low on shells, but Ukraine was low during Avdivka, and are not low now.
So, something else is definitely going on here.
What we are seeing is the beginning of the Russian equipment hunger.
If we start with artillery, it is most unusual to take such a defencive posture with your artillery if you are on the offensive, and we know that Russia is still on the offensive due to them coming running towards us in many places.
Clearly they are trying to husband what they do have remaining to drag out the war from an artillery perspective.
The same husbanding is also clear in regards of their armour.
But, to keep up speed of attack they have to resort to using less capable vehicles and keep up mobility on the theatres of operation.
It think all of this is important and highly indicative of how the war will progress over the following months.
Yes, Russia is now having a meatcube hunger, but they know that they are well able to replace the soldiers for the foreseeable future, and they are now making the preparations to throw another fresh 300K soldiers to the meatgrinder.
Throughout the war Russia has replenished with roughly 20K soldiers per month that voluntarily sign contracts, and this has been topped up with other versions of troops such as prisoners, plus the previous 300K mobiks.
But the rate of losses is now so high that they must perform another 300K mobifikation.
So, how far will that take them?
Russias burnrate is now roughly 3 000 soldiers per day in killed and wounded.
Out of those 1 000 are killed, 1 500 permanently disabled, and 500 are wounded that are recycled back into duty.
So, let us say 2 500 per day.
That means that the 300K mobiks will last 120 days, and if we add on top another 4 months of "volunteers on contract" Russia can drag that out another 30 days, totalling 150 days before they will be back at "soldier hunger", at least at the current burnrate of Russians.
At that point they will obviously just rinse/repeat and mobik another 300K soldiers into the meatgrinder.
As I said, Russia will not run out of soldiers in the next decade.
On equipment there is though an entirely different story.
At even the best metrics of Russian equipment (for Russia), they get ten items destroyed per each item produced.
And in many cases they get 1 in 100, or non at all, in new items.
So, what are the 1 in 10?
Ships and airplanes, why Russia is still spending money on building ships is just beyond me, they would be much better off constructing armour and other stuff for the money and resources used.
The airplane production is not going to go up, if anything the production rate will drop soon as foreign produced components are running dry, or Russia will have to devolve their production into new simpler airframes.
Armoured infantry vehicles and artillery systems are produced in the 1 to 100 bracket, meaning that Russia is unlikely to ever truly run out of these.
But the number is dwindling rapidly here.
When we come to tanks we are seeing a different picture.
Russia is not producing any new tanks, instead they used old tankhules and upgraded them as much as possible.
And we see no attempt at reviving their industrial capacity to produce new ones, if anything they have cancelled their newest tank from production.
Here the reason is different, and we see the same thing in the West.
The arrival of powerful attack drones and handheld anti-tank weapons have basically made the tank deader than a dodo, at least in its current form and concept.
Ukraine is now using them as movable shortrange artillery against enemy fortification and enemy trenches, but not as a main offensive weapon as such.
And Ukraine is not really asking the West for new tanks, instead they are asking for faster armoured vehicles like the CV90 familly, this due to them being better offensive platforms.
A similar thoughtline seems to also be occuring inside of Russia.
The tank had a good run, but it will now have to adapt and become faster and far more agile to fulfill any purpose on the modern battlefield.
Anyway, in the next few months we will most likely continue to see this trend of less equipment usage on the Russian side.
This will further lower the numbers blown up, and slowly the number of casualties will continue to climb.
One effect this will have is that the types of mines used will change from anti-armour mines towards more usage of troop mines in the Ukrainian defencive lines.
This is obviously going to increase the lossrate of Russia in regards of mobiks, but it is longterm problematic for Ukraine since these mines are harder to clear later on after the victory.
Consumables
There is also the possibility that this is due to another reason, or more likely that there is a combination of two effects.
Russians are lacking trucks for their supply chain now, and they are lacking fuel bowsers, and fuel in general.
This means that they will save up on consumables both from a logistics perspective, and from an availability perspective, by changing over from heavy equipment systems to "meatcubes".
A soldier just needs a few bullets if you do not feed your troops like the Russians do.
Whereas a tank need fuel, spareparts, and heavy and bulky munitions.
Conclusion
If this trend continue we will see Russian effectiveness drop further, and the lossrate will continue to climb.
Currently it seems like the increase will be between 50-100 killed per day each month.
This will obviously mean that the Russian "people hunger" will occur more frequently, and that Russia will either have to increase the frequency of mobifikations, or mobify more people each round.
Regardless, this is a very cynical way of using your troops, and it speaks volumes about the Russian leadership and how they think about their own population.
I am certain that the upcoming waves of mobifikation will over time increase the protests that we are seeing now, and things might explode already during this mobifikation round, but I do not think so, I think Russians need at least two more rounds before becoming angry enough to do something.
But, the signs of anger is now quite visible.
Election
Just a shortie here that I thought important.
Yesterday at 1300 the local TV station reported that 3.92 percent of the population in Bilhorod Oblast had voted.
At 1500 the central election committee reported that 50.25 percent of the Bilhorod Oblast had voted.
As Konstantin pointed out, that means that 550 000 Bilhorodians had voted in just 2 hours, during active shelling.
The 3.92 percent was probably the true and real figure.
Bilhorod is a bit special, but note how empty all the voting offices in other Oblasts are on the Babushka attack videos where they start fires or ink ballot boxes.
Let us say that the total of voters yesterday reached some 20 percent, and that today the number will reach a total of 50 percent tops...
That means that the rest are so arsed about things that they are not even going for the cash incentives, and instead risk persecution later on for not having voted.
Also, note that the punishment for inking or burning a ballot box is 10 years, and if you throw a molotov cocktail the punishment is 15 to 25 years.
Those babushkas are not arsed, they know this full well and still go about doing it, they are that level of ***ed.
They do it, and just stand there waiting to be arrested and taken away.
Putin has always had his most fervent supporters among the babushkas, and he has taken good care of these core voters and made certain that they have gotten real life improvements, and they used to truly love him for this.
And that made him popular in other groups too, "he takes care of our beloved babushkas, he must be a good man at heart" thing was going on.
But now at least some of them are truly angered with him, and I bet that this is due to all of the inking and burning babushkas having lost a son or grandson in the war.
And for each burning and inking babushka there's probably one hundred truly ***ed off babushkas that didn't ink, and those are most likely openly talking **** about Putin by now, and Russians tend to follow where the babushkas go... otherwise they do not get cookies.
Babushkie power is truly a thing in Russia, you just do as they say or they cut you off from the cookie jar.
Babushkas held Putin in power, and babushka cookie-influencers will be his downfall.
Every angry babushka has younger relatives that will do as they say to get access to their cookie allowance at all cost.
Each mobifikation will bring more than 300 000 **** ***ed babushkas, and their relatives will be angry too on their behalf.
As one Babushka stated:
"I survived Staling, Gulag and the downfall of the Soviet Union, I am not scared of Putin".
No, they truly do not give a ****, they just liked him because he took care of them, and now that he is killing their children and grandchildren they will show him how few **** they give about him now. "
"Disparity
If anything the number of killed Russians have gone up somewhat post Avdivka, just a few percent, but the trend is slowly upwards.
At the time we see a slow creep downwards in the number of destroyed tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery.
The interesting difference is that we see a slow creep upwards in the numbers of destroyed other vehicles.
So, what is going on?
Let us start at the end.
Russia is now using the Chinese unarmoured "golf-carts" that they bought in their thousands.
Obviously these are not military vehicles in any aspect of the modern meaning of it, instead these used to be sold in vibrant colours to gardening companies and to cemetaries and so on.
They are not made for the rigors of the behind of a battlefield, and when used in the actual frontline they quickly suffer from Rigor Mortis.
But Russia will use anything in their attempts to make progress.
It is though good to remember that they are so unarmoured that they lack doors and windshields.
Beside this they are using 4-wheel mini-thingies, that variety that is famous for tipping over and crushing their owners.
And this is sprinkled in with Ladas rampacked with soldiers driving like crazy towards the Ukrainians.
We are still seeing tanks and armoured vehicles, but the columns are now gone or smaller, instead they use one or two tanks and a couple of armoured vehicles during attacks, interspersed with the more "unusual stuff".
At the same time Russia is using more soldiers in each attack, complete with suicide squads running infront of the vehicles and armour.
Troops who's only job is to try to clear mines and to defend the armour and vehicles.
If these are attacked the vehicles and armour normally now attempt an about turn.
Another goal of the suicide troops are to draw in the FPV attack drones and deplete them, but since these are accompanied by surveillance drones, the Ukrainian troops are rarely duped by this.
At the same time Russia has made changes to the locationing of their artillery, they now have it in 3 lines that are thinner.
The forwardmost is designed to try to fire on Ukrainian artillery and villages.
The mediumline is designed to fire on the Ukrainian lines, and is meant to be somewhat safe from Ukrainian artillery, but due to the disparity in range this is not true.
The rear line is there to answer if there is a Ukrainian breakthrough, or as a ready reserve, Russians believe these are safe from drones and artillery, but they are not safe from GLSDBs and the new longer ranged drones appearing on the battlefield.
Now, let us talk about the why.
Normally if you see a drop in equipment losses you would expect a similar corresponding drop in troop losses.
This would be a sign of a decrease in offensive operations, or correspondingly a drop in your own offencive operations.
But, that is not the case on either side.
Next reason would be that you are low on shells, but Ukraine was low during Avdivka, and are not low now.
So, something else is definitely going on here.
What we are seeing is the beginning of the Russian equipment hunger.
If we start with artillery, it is most unusual to take such a defencive posture with your artillery if you are on the offensive, and we know that Russia is still on the offensive due to them coming running towards us in many places.
Clearly they are trying to husband what they do have remaining to drag out the war from an artillery perspective.
The same husbanding is also clear in regards of their armour.
But, to keep up speed of attack they have to resort to using less capable vehicles and keep up mobility on the theatres of operation.
It think all of this is important and highly indicative of how the war will progress over the following months.
Yes, Russia is now having a meatcube hunger, but they know that they are well able to replace the soldiers for the foreseeable future, and they are now making the preparations to throw another fresh 300K soldiers to the meatgrinder.
Throughout the war Russia has replenished with roughly 20K soldiers per month that voluntarily sign contracts, and this has been topped up with other versions of troops such as prisoners, plus the previous 300K mobiks.
But the rate of losses is now so high that they must perform another 300K mobifikation.
So, how far will that take them?
Russias burnrate is now roughly 3 000 soldiers per day in killed and wounded.
Out of those 1 000 are killed, 1 500 permanently disabled, and 500 are wounded that are recycled back into duty.
So, let us say 2 500 per day.
That means that the 300K mobiks will last 120 days, and if we add on top another 4 months of "volunteers on contract" Russia can drag that out another 30 days, totalling 150 days before they will be back at "soldier hunger", at least at the current burnrate of Russians.
At that point they will obviously just rinse/repeat and mobik another 300K soldiers into the meatgrinder.
As I said, Russia will not run out of soldiers in the next decade.
On equipment there is though an entirely different story.
At even the best metrics of Russian equipment (for Russia), they get ten items destroyed per each item produced.
And in many cases they get 1 in 100, or non at all, in new items.
So, what are the 1 in 10?
Ships and airplanes, why Russia is still spending money on building ships is just beyond me, they would be much better off constructing armour and other stuff for the money and resources used.
The airplane production is not going to go up, if anything the production rate will drop soon as foreign produced components are running dry, or Russia will have to devolve their production into new simpler airframes.
Armoured infantry vehicles and artillery systems are produced in the 1 to 100 bracket, meaning that Russia is unlikely to ever truly run out of these.
But the number is dwindling rapidly here.
When we come to tanks we are seeing a different picture.
Russia is not producing any new tanks, instead they used old tankhules and upgraded them as much as possible.
And we see no attempt at reviving their industrial capacity to produce new ones, if anything they have cancelled their newest tank from production.
Here the reason is different, and we see the same thing in the West.
The arrival of powerful attack drones and handheld anti-tank weapons have basically made the tank deader than a dodo, at least in its current form and concept.
Ukraine is now using them as movable shortrange artillery against enemy fortification and enemy trenches, but not as a main offensive weapon as such.
And Ukraine is not really asking the West for new tanks, instead they are asking for faster armoured vehicles like the CV90 familly, this due to them being better offensive platforms.
A similar thoughtline seems to also be occuring inside of Russia.
The tank had a good run, but it will now have to adapt and become faster and far more agile to fulfill any purpose on the modern battlefield.
Anyway, in the next few months we will most likely continue to see this trend of less equipment usage on the Russian side.
This will further lower the numbers blown up, and slowly the number of casualties will continue to climb.
One effect this will have is that the types of mines used will change from anti-armour mines towards more usage of troop mines in the Ukrainian defencive lines.
This is obviously going to increase the lossrate of Russia in regards of mobiks, but it is longterm problematic for Ukraine since these mines are harder to clear later on after the victory.
Consumables
There is also the possibility that this is due to another reason, or more likely that there is a combination of two effects.
Russians are lacking trucks for their supply chain now, and they are lacking fuel bowsers, and fuel in general.
This means that they will save up on consumables both from a logistics perspective, and from an availability perspective, by changing over from heavy equipment systems to "meatcubes".
A soldier just needs a few bullets if you do not feed your troops like the Russians do.
Whereas a tank need fuel, spareparts, and heavy and bulky munitions.
Conclusion
If this trend continue we will see Russian effectiveness drop further, and the lossrate will continue to climb.
Currently it seems like the increase will be between 50-100 killed per day each month.
This will obviously mean that the Russian "people hunger" will occur more frequently, and that Russia will either have to increase the frequency of mobifikations, or mobify more people each round.
Regardless, this is a very cynical way of using your troops, and it speaks volumes about the Russian leadership and how they think about their own population.
I am certain that the upcoming waves of mobifikation will over time increase the protests that we are seeing now, and things might explode already during this mobifikation round, but I do not think so, I think Russians need at least two more rounds before becoming angry enough to do something.
But, the signs of anger is now quite visible.
Election
Just a shortie here that I thought important.
Yesterday at 1300 the local TV station reported that 3.92 percent of the population in Bilhorod Oblast had voted.
At 1500 the central election committee reported that 50.25 percent of the Bilhorod Oblast had voted.
As Konstantin pointed out, that means that 550 000 Bilhorodians had voted in just 2 hours, during active shelling.
The 3.92 percent was probably the true and real figure.
Bilhorod is a bit special, but note how empty all the voting offices in other Oblasts are on the Babushka attack videos where they start fires or ink ballot boxes.
Let us say that the total of voters yesterday reached some 20 percent, and that today the number will reach a total of 50 percent tops...
That means that the rest are so arsed about things that they are not even going for the cash incentives, and instead risk persecution later on for not having voted.
Also, note that the punishment for inking or burning a ballot box is 10 years, and if you throw a molotov cocktail the punishment is 15 to 25 years.
Those babushkas are not arsed, they know this full well and still go about doing it, they are that level of ***ed.
They do it, and just stand there waiting to be arrested and taken away.
Putin has always had his most fervent supporters among the babushkas, and he has taken good care of these core voters and made certain that they have gotten real life improvements, and they used to truly love him for this.
And that made him popular in other groups too, "he takes care of our beloved babushkas, he must be a good man at heart" thing was going on.
But now at least some of them are truly angered with him, and I bet that this is due to all of the inking and burning babushkas having lost a son or grandson in the war.
And for each burning and inking babushka there's probably one hundred truly ***ed off babushkas that didn't ink, and those are most likely openly talking **** about Putin by now, and Russians tend to follow where the babushkas go... otherwise they do not get cookies.
Babushkie power is truly a thing in Russia, you just do as they say or they cut you off from the cookie jar.
Babushkas held Putin in power, and babushka cookie-influencers will be his downfall.
Every angry babushka has younger relatives that will do as they say to get access to their cookie allowance at all cost.
Each mobifikation will bring more than 300 000 **** ***ed babushkas, and their relatives will be angry too on their behalf.
As one Babushka stated:
"I survived Staling, Gulag and the downfall of the Soviet Union, I am not scared of Putin".
No, they truly do not give a ****, they just liked him because he took care of them, and now that he is killing their children and grandchildren they will show him how few **** they give about him now. "
Just in, Petr Pavel has just had a few more beers with far eastern friends and come away with another 700 thousand shells for UAF.
You heard it here first.
You heard it here first.
Defender 4x4
Well-known member
Hope the UAF have the barrels to use them in.