The end?

Well here's one that was on no-one's WTF next in Russia bingo card! Our man just messaged to say that the "St Petersburg Exile Government" (which, after some clarification turned out to be the oblast Duma) has contacted the Swedish foreign ministry to negotiate becoming part of Sweden. Mate is completely flummoxed. Especially given historical emnity. Apparently, for historical reasons it was seen as a better option than Poland or Finland. Apparently even Bildt was speechless for a change.
I think I will need to see some of the source’s other predictions/claims proving to be accurate before I take a story like this with anything other than a pinch of salt.
 
I think I will need to see some of the source’s other predictions/claims proving to be accurate before I take a story like this with anything other than a pinch of salt.

Well plenty have as it happens but nowt wrong with healthy scepticism. He is sceptical about this going anywhere himself as it happens. It was a first, tentative and underhand enquiry. Don't think the Swedes have figured a response yet. Some interesting cryptic tweets on twitter.

 
Maybe. Maybe not. Separating predictions, which he doesn't really make too many of, from his reporting of events before they become more widely known, his actual factual info is generally good. It's his job. But he doubts anything will come of this ... not in the near future anyway.
 
NATO is a defensive alliance .. if Poland chooses to attack Belarus then that, and any consequences, is on them and nothing to do with NATO
That's not the case. If they enter the conflict and the Russians retaliate against them (which they would almost surely do), NATO Article 5 comes into effect and every NATO member is obligated to become involved.

So in my opinion there's no way Poland is about to become a part of the conflict. It would all but guarantee that the entire NATO membership would be dragged into a war that none of them want to be involved in.
 
That's not the case. If they enter the conflict and the Russians retaliate against them (which they would almost surely do), NATO Article 5 comes into effect and every NATO member is obligated to become involved.

So in my opinion there's no way Poland is about to become a part of the conflict. It would all but guarantee that the entire NATO membership would be dragged into a war that none of them want to be involved in.
It’s not going to happen.
 
Maybe. Maybe not. Separating predictions, which he doesn't really make too many of, from his reporting of events before they become more widely known, his actual factual info is generally good. It's his job. But he doubts anything will come of this ... not in the near future anyway.

Unfortunately I have lost track on all of this. My oldest friend died around this time last year.
He was a city politician, refusing on numerous occasions to stand for Parliament, principally because of the Social Dems move to the right over a number of years, eventually ending up In Vänsterpartiet a couple of years before he died. We talked several times a week. Music and politics mainly.
So, quite honestly lost interest. The St.Petersburg thing. Not in our lifetime😉
 
That's not the case. If they enter the conflict and the Russians retaliate against them (which they would almost surely do), NATO Article 5 comes into effect and every NATO member is obligated to become involved.

So in my opinion there's no way Poland is about to become a part of the conflict. It would all but guarantee that the entire NATO membership would be dragged into a war that none of them want to be involved in.
No it wouldn't.

NATO is purely a defensive alliance .. if a member chooses to start its own or gets involved in anothers war then it's on it's own.

Otherwise .. you'd have a lot of the smaller NATO countries attacking the countries they have beef with "knowing" they can't be attacked back because NATO would get involved.

Would be a charter for WW III.
 
Unfortunately I have lost track on all of this. My oldest friend died around this time last year.
He was a city politician, refusing on numerous occasions to stand for Parliament, principally because of the Social Dems move to the right over a number of years, eventually ending up In Vänsterpartiet a couple of years before he died. We talked several times a week. Music and politics mainly.
So, quite honestly lost interest. The St.Petersburg thing. Not in our lifetime😉

Sorry to hear that. At least he was spared the appalling spectacle of the Sweden Democrats coming to power. Re. St. Petersburg, the phone call did happen. But, like you, I think anything like that happening soon is unlikely. Though I think it's more important as a signifier of mood. And I think it is coming from the same Duma that precipitated this thread back in September.
 
Hapy New Year. Or not.

"To the naked eye not much is happening in Ukraine, and what is happening is mainly Russian activity.
One might think that Ukraine is sitting on its collective **** while Russia is attacking all the time with missiles and drones.
This is quite far from what is happening.

Muddy Winters
Since winter failed to be winter, Ukraine had to cancel any large advances, with the possible exception of possibly Luhansk.
Yes, things might freeze over, but the time of freezing will by now most likely be to short to give enough time for a large advance.
Instead Ukraine has gone back to the time tested tactic of eating borstj and shelling the living bejeezus out of the Russians.
This is interspersed with smaller attacks and advances as permitted and needed in the general direction of what Ukraine is intending to do from a strategic standpoint.
This means that Ukraine can fairly safely keep up the high casualty rate for the Russians as they congregate in large numbers in large warm houses.
This is quite understandable on the Russian part since they do not want to turn into the ever popular Russicles.

Yesterday Russian sources claimed that 600 men died in a single attack on a compound, due to Russians storing artillery ammunition inside the barracks. This is the single most stupid thing that Russia has done in the war... and that does not say little.
One might see the borstjing of Russians as a very prolonged pre-staging before the spring offensive kicks off as the mud season ends.

The limited advance around Bakhmut by the Ukrainian is still ongoing, but Ukraine is not releasing a lot.
What is know that the Russians have been pushed back between 2.5 and 5km around Bakhmut, it would have been a perfect time to push further ahead but the mud is not making it possible.
Instead Ukraine are clearing along the roads and putting up advance staging points for the future.

Kreminna is slowly turning into another Bakhmut in reverse.
Russia is pouring in resources while Ukraine is slowly gaining ground by artillery fire alone.
I suspect that Ukraine will soon do limited manouvre warfare and push the Russians out when the forces are depleted enough and the ground can carry tanks.
According to our favourite Colonel* it was very muddy as she pushed them back a few days ago.

Missiles over Kyiv (etc)
Russias missile barrages are now around half the size as previously, and they are more limited in scope.
If our numbers are correct Russia has between 120 and 200 missiles remaining + a couple of hundred S300s. So, 2 to 4 more attacks of limited scope.
This has forced Russia to go back to the Iranien suicide drones, and they are really ineffective against the western air defence.

Missiles over Moscow (etc)
What was missed was the Ukrainian missile attacks during the New Years Eve (and day).
Engels and a couple more airfields was hit again deep inside Russia, and Russia is now forced to move their air force outside of the 1000km perimeter.
And Russia lacks the needed air refueling capacity to continue air operation over Ukraine on any larger scale.
This is a huge strategic victory on Ukraines part.

There was also attacks with missiles in several key Russian cities, among them St Petersburg and Moscow.
This was not appreciated among Russian propagandists, and forced Russia to step up the ineffective drone-attacks.

Artillery
Russia is now in very bad shape for being Russia.
During the first 6 months of the War Russia used about 40 000 artillery shells together with GRAD-rockets per day.
In the last 4 months this has slowly fallen down to 2500 units per day.
For any other country this would be impressive, but since Russia is totally reliant on massive artillery and lack other offensive means after losing the tank advantage, it is bad. Real bad...
This number is believed to drop down over the next few months to Russias shell production rate of 500 pieces per day, baring Ukrainian attacks on those production facilities.
There are no signs of production of weapons and ammunition increasing inside Russia, if anything those number are dropping.

Time
Against all punditary belief time is well and truly on Ukraines side.
They are receiving more equipment and ammunition than Russia, and the support is not dwindling like Russia hoped.
At least for the next 6 months Ukraine will receive what they need.
At the same time Russia is breaking down slowly, with production of war items slowly dropping as more workers are mobiked and more and more factories burn up, or are blown up.
At the same time Western economy is slowly settling into a sort of wartime economy and inflation is slowly dropping again. Energy prices are now stabilised, and Russias hydrocarbon exports are rapidly dwindling due to Russian missmanagement.

Both Europe and the US are amply showing evidence of being ready to outstubborn the Russians, same with the Ukrainians.

Moscow (et al)
Jesus Strelkov, the Gerkin of all Russias, are still at it building support, him taking power would end the war, and take Russia into a pre-revolution period of mysticism and Tzarist trappings.
More and more talk is going on inside of Russia to name the Prime Minister Mishustin as Putins successor. This would be a continuation of the Russian government, but probably the war would end.
Then we have Prigozhin who is happily dreaming about taking power in Russia to continue the war, and to make it into a pure Mafia run tzardom.
Of the 3 currently Mishustin and Jesus Strelkov of the Gerkin are the top contenders, and I suspect that there is a window in the future of Prigozhin.

Russia is starting to show the first signs of a breakup, and as with everything else, it is happening in a direction that was not expected.
The first signs are coming from the westernmost parts, with both Karelia and St Petersburg making underhand contacts with the west.
Karelia is quietly sounding the stage for a return to Finland, and St Pete's for joining Sweden.
So far St Petersburg Oblast seems to be the most serious one, with something ironically called the St Petersburg Exile Government making contact about leaving Russia.
The irony is that it is the regional council of St Petersburg that is the so called exile government...
These underhand contacts have been met with quite a bit of consternation, and even horror.
Even if all the legal niceties could be met like referendums in St Pete's and Sweden, and The Petersburgians gaining territorial sovereignty of their own, and EU accepting it in the end... it would still be a reunion that would make the German reunification look like a cakewalk.
Gobbling up and westernifying the most western oriented City of Russia, and then having a country of 10 million people being injected with a further 8 million Russian speaking people... Cheezus in a handbasket...

Sweden just discovered that our 200 year old fever-dream starting to come true is a logistical nightmare.
There is also the not so small problem that this would turn Finland and Sweden into a rather annoying global power, and Swede's famously do not play nice as an empire.
I am quite happy to leave that nightmare in the hands of the likes of Bildt and the Wallenbergs.
I do though admit that I quite enjoy the vision of a huge honking Swedish flag once more flying above the Viborg Fortress, and turning the Baltic into a Swedish inner sea.
But realistically? Gah!

Anyway, it is at least a sign that parts of Russia are contemplating leaving Russia, and seeing the most westernised parts thinking about it... then pondering what is going on in the Far East and in Basjkortostan etcetera...
2023 will be very interesting indeed.

At the same time we have continued to pre-base two entire heavy brigades in the Baltics due to NATO-requirements.
Seems like we got shafted with defending those 3 countries until more troops can arrive.
A year ago I would have laughed, but with Russia as weakened as it is, it is doable to cut the Russian army up with two heavy armoured Brigades and air superiority + the local armies.
I am not so sure that the plan of having a Swedish army smiling benignly upon all of Russias across the border is so wise. Swedish armies tend to get busy when being close to Russia... Not even I trust us.

*Colonel tank girl: I should probably clear up a couple of things. Her name is first of all not Slav1nska, secondly I have altered a few details of her looks. I suspect you understood this, but it is still good to point out my Bowdlerisation of her.
Otherwise she is pretty much exactly as I described her, gungho colonel and all.
I will though continue to name her as Slav1nska until the war ends, or she dies.
Being sent to various hellholes is probably gonna cut her career short sooner or later, she is quite happy with that prospect.

Anyway, she is now packing up in Bakhmut moving out towards frostier grounds after having gained an entire artillery brigade briming with western artillery as a Christmas Bonus...
All she is now waiting for are the new promised western tanks for the spring offensive later on.
I know what she is gonna attacknow , and I would not want to be on the receiving end of her wrath and little well-equiped personal army.
You will understand what and where as she arrives in a little while...
She will not dawdle, it will be the customary 20 hours of Slav1nska-style artillery upon arrival, and then 3 well executed tank manouvre charges as per usual, and that should be it for the place in question.
It will though be much bloodier than what happened upon her arrival in Bakhmut.
There she just tipped the balance and chased the Wagnerites off, here she will have to crush things on a completely different scale."
 
My guess is our Tank Girl will be helping to kick out the Russians from the last bit of the Kharkiv Oblast or just driving in to the northern part of the Luhansk Oblast. As I understand it, there is open flat less populated country there and she is fond of Thunder Roads.
 
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Lot's of ruminating in this one, but some key numbers which will be as close to factual as they can get. He's clearly not chuffed about being wrong on the 24th though :) If some of this doesn't make total sense it is because he is addressing questions from one of the small group of recipients.

"The short winter might be to short to even help with a short offensive.
You need days of cold for the ground to freeze enough to carry the tanks.

It was definitely true back then.
But, during those months the situation has improved somewhat on the Ukrainian side and will continue to improve towards the spring offensive.
But, the big difference is the Russian situation. There is considerable doubt that they can perform a pincer manouver with the supply of artillery shells that they are currently down to. And the supply issue will be even worse when spring arrives and the ground dries up.
Time is right now truly in favour of Ukraine.
They can happily borstj Russians with precission strikes.
Their inventory goes up due to the lull.
Russian inventory and manpower constantly erodes.

Just to point out how bad it is for the Russians.
Ukraine produces more new tanks than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more artillery shells than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more missiles and drones than Russia does.
This on top of what Ukraine receives from abroad (it is a lot really).
All Russia has been doing for two months is waste lives.
And the waste of lives is just continuing and will increase over time due to lack of all other resources.

Personally I do not like the Melitopol alternative, neither from a strategic, nor a tactical standpoint.
But, I understand their need to do it since they lack the landbridge directly into Kherson.
What Ukraine needs to do short to mid-term is to shorten the frontline to be able to concentrate firepower.
And that would ideally mean going Kherson, Crimea, Zhaporishia, in that order.
Anyway, Melitopol will not happen until spring.
And in the meantime everyone in Ukraine hopes for the miracle that they can cross directly into Kherson somehow.
It is possible if they can erode the Russians there sufficiently for a combined amphibeous attack taking back the bridgeheads and then storming over with heavy equipment.
But, obviously Surovikin knows this.
So, Ukraine will need to push Surovikin everywhere.
This is why I am harping about Vuhledar all the time.
Even a minor push here locks down enormous Russian resources since it is the Achilles heel in the Russian defence. Sadly it is not the best part for Ukraine to attack right now since a big offensive here would really put them in a position that can get pinched, and would create even more frontline to cover with no way to go yet.

That is why we will soon see a couple of hard limited pushes in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Bakhmut was the first limited counter-punch, another is coming very soon.
You will know when it happens, just look for all the things going bööm in the customary artillery barrage.

The Devil's Alternative
There is a political alternative that would shorten the frontline considerably.
It is frought with perril, and it is rather unsavoury for everyone.
It is to strike a deal with Lukashenka and wrestle him out from under Russias boot.
It would create an enormous headache for Russia that they are not currently equiped to handle, they just can't take Belarus at this point in time. Russia would lose half of its technological capacity and production, and it would create a longer frontline of sorts for Russia.
How it could be done I do not know, all I know is that the price would be high.
But, I think it may be worthwhile to pursue.
Heck, even the confusion of a failed attempt would take a lot of resources for the Russians to handle.

People
Every pundit in existance harps on how Russia can just draw on endless resources of people to drown Ukraine.
Problem is just that soldiers needs equipment, and Russia is out of that.
Second part is that they are comparing with the Soviet Union during WWII.
In reality Russia of today have a problem with manpower.
3.5 million. This is what is left of an entire generation fit for work and fighting.
Ukraine has 5 million men available. Plus another 5 million women.
Russian demographics are worse than even Japans by now.
This is why you see old alcoholics and children turning up at the front.
They can either send more able bodied to the front and all production in Russia stops.
Current real figure of men under arms in all of Russias separate parts of the defence force is down to 700 000... and that includes the navy and the air force.
Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.
Pundits seem to need a math lesson instead of more history lessons.

The End
I still stand by my old prediction, technically the war was lost and over on the 24th of December, and that I failed in taking into account how stubborn Russia is.
This obviously means that Russia is on borrowed time, and when the end comes it will be extremely fast.
It all now hinges on how much longer Russia can behave as a man sniffing the southern end of northbound mule.
Even a small loss could theoretically be the small lump of grass that tips the load of hay unto the street.

They took the minor loss around Bakhmut badly, and the loss of between 300-600 soldiers in one Himars strike, plus the missile strikes deep in Russia.
By now it is evident that there is no hope at all in Russia, they are just taking the pain.
After all, there should be gain after pain.
Russia is by now like a dude going to the gym, getting training aches, and gaining in fat and losing muscle mass.
No gain, all pain.

How will Russia react to a couple of more important setbacks in Luhansk?

Losing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk?
These are realistic winter goals for Ukraine.
More military and power installations exploding in Russia?
More missiles over Moscow?

How will they react when the Russian offensive in the end of February fails abysmaly? (if it even happens, it will be around the 24th... Russians are numberophiles, and they love to repeat their mistakes in exactly the same way)
How will they react when the Ukrainian big offensive starts in April and they lose an Oblast or two?

How will they react to the Ukrainian summer offensive?
Another Oblast or two?
How will they react to the Ukrainian autumn offensive?
Another Oblast or two?

When will things start to really break down in Russia?
When will Russia break?
Time to really sniff that southern end of the northbound mule."
 
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Lot's of ruminating in this one, but some key numbers which will be as close to factual as they can get. He's clearly not chuffed about being wrong on the 24th though :) If some of this doesn't make total sense it is because he is addressing questions from one of the small group of recipients.

"The short winter might be to short to even help with a short offensive.
You need days of cold for the ground to freeze enough to carry the tanks.

It was definitely true back then.
But, during those months the situation has improved somewhat on the Ukrainian side and will continue to improve towards the spring offensive.
But, the big difference is the Russian situation. There is considerable doubt that they can perform a pincer manouver with the supply of artillery shells that they are currently down to. And the supply issue will be even worse when spring arrives and the ground dries up.
Time is right now truly in favour of Ukraine.
They can happily borstj Russians with precission strikes.
Their inventory goes up due to the lull.
Russian inventory and manpower constantly erodes.

Just to point out how bad it is for the Russians.
Ukraine produces more new tanks than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more artillery shells than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more missiles and drones than Russia does.
This on top of what Ukraine receives from abroad (it is a lot really).
All Russia has been doing for two months is waste lives.
And the waste of lives is just continuing and will increase over time due to lack of all other resources.

Personally I do not like the Melitopol alternative, neither from a strategic, nor a tactical standpoint.
But, I understand their need to do it since they lack the landbridge directly into Kherson.
What Ukraine needs to do short to mid-term is to shorten the frontline to be able to concentrate firepower.
And that would ideally mean going Kherson, Crimea, Zhaporishia, in that order.
Anyway, Melitopol will not happen until spring.
And in the meantime everyone in Ukraine hopes for the miracle that they can cross directly into Kherson somehow.
It is possible if they can erode the Russians there sufficiently for a combined amphibeous attack taking back the bridgeheads and then storming over with heavy equipment.
But, obviously Surovikin knows this.
So, Ukraine will need to push Surovikin everywhere.
This is why I am harping about Vuhledar all the time.
Even a minor push here locks down enormous Russian resources since it is the Achilles heel in the Russian defence. Sadly it is not the best part for Ukraine to attack right now since a big offensive here would really put them in a position that can get pinched, and would create even more frontline to cover with no way to go yet.

That is why we will soon see a couple of hard limited pushes in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Bakhmut was the first limited counter-punch, another is coming very soon.
You will know when it happens, just look for all the things going bööm in the customary artillery barrage.

The Devil's Alternative
There is a political alternative that would shorten the frontline considerably.
It is frought with perril, and it is rather unsavoury for everyone.
It is to strike a deal with Lukashenka and wrestle him out from under Russias boot.
It would create an enormous headache for Russia that they are not currently equiped to handle, they just can't take Belarus at this point in time. Russia would lose half of its technological capacity and production, and it would create a longer frontline of sorts for Russia.
How it could be done I do not know, all I know is that the price would be high.
But, I think it may be worthwhile to pursue.
Heck, even the confusion of a failed attempt would take a lot of resources for the Russians to handle.

People
Every pundit in existance harps on how Russia can just draw on endless resources of people to drown Ukraine.
Problem is just that soldiers needs equipment, and Russia is out of that.
Second part is that they are comparing with the Soviet Union during WWII.
In reality Russia of today have a problem with manpower.
3.5 million. This is what is left of an entire generation fit for work and fighting.
Ukraine has 5 million men available. Plus another 5 million women.
Russian demographics are worse than even Japans by now.
This is why you see old alcoholics and children turning up at the front.
They can either send more able bodied to the front and all production in Russia stops.
Current real figure of men under arms in all of Russias separate parts of the defence force is down to 700 000... and that includes the navy and the air force.
Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.
Pundits seem to need a math lesson instead of more history lessons.

The End
I still stand by my old prediction, technically the war was lost and over on the 24th of December, and that I failed in taking into account how stubborn Russia is.
This obviously means that Russia is on borrowed time, and when the end comes it will be extremely fast.
It all now hinges on how much longer Russia can behave as a man sniffing the southern end of northbound mule.
Even a small loss could theoretically be the small lump of grass that tips the load of hay unto the street.

They took the minor loss around Bakhmut badly, and the loss of between 300-600 soldiers in one Himars strike, plus the missile strikes deep in Russia.
By now it is evident that there is no hope at all in Russia, they are just taking the pain.
After all, there should be gain after pain.
Russia is by now like a dude going to the gym, getting training aches, and gaining in fat and losing muscle mass.
No gain, all pain.

How will Russia react to a couple of more important setbacks in Luhansk?

Losing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk?
These are realistic winter goals for Ukraine.
More military and power installations exploding in Russia?
More missiles over Moscow?

How will they react when the Russian offensive in the end of February fails abysmaly? (if it even happens, it will be around the 24th... Russians are numberophiles, and they love to repeat their mistakes in exactly the same way)
How will they react when the Ukrainian big offensive starts in April and they lose an Oblast or two?

How will they react to the Ukrainian summer offensive?
Another Oblast or two?
How will they react to the Ukrainian autumn offensive?
Another Oblast or two?

When will things start to really break down in Russia?
When will Russia break?
Time to really sniff that southern end of the northbound mule."

Yes, the great unknown is how stubborn, how much will to fight, is still in the Russian forces.

Just on the numbers.

'Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.'

In a December 15 interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi mentioned the number of combat-ready front-line troops he had was 200,000.

That is quite a discrepancy?
 
Yes, the great unknown is how stubborn, how much will to fight, is still in the Russian forces.

Just on the numbers.

'Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.'

In a December 15 interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi mentioned the number of combat-ready front-line troops he had was 200,000.

That is quite a discrepancy?
I think the difference is combat ready and available. They may be able to call up over a million to fight, but out of them only 200000 will be combat ready I.e trained in a sufficient way to make them a capable force, otherwise they may not be much better than those under Russias conscripts.
 
I think the difference is combat ready and available. They may be able to call up over a million to fight, but out of them only 200000 will be combat ready I.e trained in a sufficient way to make them a capable force, otherwise they may not be much better than those under Russias conscripts.

It might also be that Ukraine rotate better. It's a lesson the Western allies learned well in WW2 and has been doctrine ever since. The 'frontline' might be the key word.

Also, modern armies are geared to a spearhead. Perhaps support troops don't count as 'frontline'. Usually there are as many or as more support units as frontline infantry.
 
Yes, the great unknown is how stubborn, how much will to fight, is still in the Russian forces.

Just on the numbers.

'Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.'

In a December 15 interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi mentioned the number of combat-ready front-line troops he had was 200,000.

That is quite a discrepancy?

I understood this to be people willing to fight but not yet trained.
 
It might also be that Ukraine rotate better. It's a lesson the Western allies learned well in WW2 and has been doctrine ever since. The 'frontline' might be the key word.

Also, modern armies are geared to a spearhead. Perhaps support troops don't count as 'frontline'. Usually there are as many or as more support units as frontline infantry.
Correct, but the Brits also practised this in WW1, unlike the French. Some commentators have linked the difference in the number of mutinies amongst both armies as a consequence of this.
 
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