Lot's of ruminating in this one, but some key numbers which will be as close to factual as they can get. He's clearly not chuffed about being wrong on the 24th though
If some of this doesn't make total sense it is because he is addressing questions from one of the small group of recipients.
"The short winter might be to short to even help with a short offensive.
You need days of cold for the ground to freeze enough to carry the tanks.
It was definitely true back then.
But, during those months the situation has improved somewhat on the Ukrainian side and will continue to improve towards the spring offensive.
But, the big difference is the Russian situation. There is considerable doubt that they can perform a pincer manouver with the supply of artillery shells that they are currently down to. And the supply issue will be even worse when spring arrives and the ground dries up.
Time is right now truly in favour of Ukraine.
They can happily borstj Russians with precission strikes.
Their inventory goes up due to the lull.
Russian inventory and manpower constantly erodes.
Just to point out how bad it is for the Russians.
Ukraine produces more new tanks than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more artillery shells than Russia does.
Ukraine produces more missiles and drones than Russia does.
This on top of what Ukraine receives from abroad (it is a lot really).
All Russia has been doing for two months is waste lives.
And the waste of lives is just continuing and will increase over time due to lack of all other resources.
Personally I do not like the Melitopol alternative, neither from a strategic, nor a tactical standpoint.
But, I understand their need to do it since they lack the landbridge directly into Kherson.
What Ukraine needs to do short to mid-term is to shorten the frontline to be able to concentrate firepower.
And that would ideally mean going Kherson, Crimea, Zhaporishia, in that order.
Anyway, Melitopol will not happen until spring.
And in the meantime everyone in Ukraine hopes for the miracle that they can cross directly into Kherson somehow.
It is possible if they can erode the Russians there sufficiently for a combined amphibeous attack taking back the bridgeheads and then storming over with heavy equipment.
But, obviously Surovikin knows this.
So, Ukraine will need to push Surovikin everywhere.
This is why I am harping about Vuhledar all the time.
Even a minor push here locks down enormous Russian resources since it is the Achilles heel in the Russian defence. Sadly it is not the best part for Ukraine to attack right now since a big offensive here would really put them in a position that can get pinched, and would create even more frontline to cover with no way to go yet.
That is why we will soon see a couple of hard limited pushes in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Bakhmut was the first limited counter-punch, another is coming very soon.
You will know when it happens, just look for all the things going bööm in the customary artillery barrage.
The Devil's Alternative
There is a political alternative that would shorten the frontline considerably.
It is frought with perril, and it is rather unsavoury for everyone.
It is to strike a deal with Lukashenka and wrestle him out from under Russias boot.
It would create an enormous headache for Russia that they are not currently equiped to handle, they just can't take Belarus at this point in time. Russia would lose half of its technological capacity and production, and it would create a longer frontline of sorts for Russia.
How it could be done I do not know, all I know is that the price would be high.
But, I think it may be worthwhile to pursue.
Heck, even the confusion of a failed attempt would take a lot of resources for the Russians to handle.
People
Every pundit in existance harps on how Russia can just draw on endless resources of people to drown Ukraine.
Problem is just that soldiers needs equipment, and Russia is out of that.
Second part is that they are comparing with the Soviet Union during WWII.
In reality Russia of today have a problem with manpower.
3.5 million. This is what is left of an entire generation fit for work and fighting.
Ukraine has 5 million men available. Plus another 5 million women.
Russian demographics are worse than even Japans by now.
This is why you see old alcoholics and children turning up at the front.
They can either send more able bodied to the front and all production in Russia stops.
Current real figure of men under arms in all of Russias separate parts of the defence force is down to 700 000... and that includes the navy and the air force.
Ukraine has one million under arms and have a list of new recruits that are more than willing that is close to two million.
Pundits seem to need a math lesson instead of more history lessons.
The End
I still stand by my old prediction, technically the war was lost and over on the 24th of December, and that I failed in taking into account how stubborn Russia is.
This obviously means that Russia is on borrowed time, and when the end comes it will be extremely fast.
It all now hinges on how much longer Russia can behave as a man sniffing the southern end of northbound mule.
Even a small loss could theoretically be the small lump of grass that tips the load of hay unto the street.
They took the minor loss around Bakhmut badly, and the loss of between 300-600 soldiers in one Himars strike, plus the missile strikes deep in Russia.
By now it is evident that there is no hope at all in Russia, they are just taking the pain.
After all, there should be gain after pain.
Russia is by now like a dude going to the gym, getting training aches, and gaining in fat and losing muscle mass.
No gain, all pain.
How will Russia react to a couple of more important setbacks in Luhansk?
Losing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk?
These are realistic winter goals for Ukraine.
More military and power installations exploding in Russia?
More missiles over Moscow?
How will they react when the Russian offensive in the end of February fails abysmaly? (if it even happens, it will be around the 24th... Russians are numberophiles, and they love to repeat their mistakes in exactly the same way)
How will they react when the Ukrainian big offensive starts in April and they lose an Oblast or two?
How will they react to the Ukrainian summer offensive?
Another Oblast or two?
How will they react to the Ukrainian autumn offensive?
Another Oblast or two?
When will things start to really break down in Russia?
When will Russia break?
Time to really sniff that southern end of the northbound mule."