So, here you go, another set of notes from a man in the thick of it who is kind enough to put finger to keyboard and say what he thinks.
I mulled for a while whether to post this or not. In the end, I thought it was probably worth doing on balance. It's not a wholeheartedly positive missive. It is what it is.
"In the last couple of days it has become clear that changes have occured on the Russian side, and those are quite dramatic to boot.
Let us go through those together.
Equipment
Russia is now suffering from a critical lack of key equipment, with the two largest problems being a lack of tanks, and a lack of artillery systems.
We can clearly see the lack of tanks since Russia pretty much has not used them in the last 48 hours.
In that time span only two tanks have been destroyed, with 0 on the 15th, and 2 on the 16th.
In the last two weeks we have seen only two trainsets of tanks arrive, and both of them contained either geriatric T62's or dinosaus T55's.
Neither the amount, nor the type, is able to make a difference.
We also notice the lack of artillery in the not so small fact that Ukraine is now able to knock out and keep out artillery from areas of the frontline.
There just isn't enough systems around for Russia to quickly be able to close those gaps, and if replacements arrive those are coming piecemeal and in to low numbers to really be able to plug the gap before they are blown up.
And if we look in the deep rear, there are no reserves remaining, so Russia has to thin the line to be able to plug at other spots.
Manpower
If we look at the numbers of liquidated Russian soldiers, these are still above 1K on average.
But they have dropped with about 10 percent in the last week.
And the reason the number is still up there is because Ukraine is now actively looking for Russian soldiers.
In Kharkiv, Klichiivka and Kreminna this is due to actively going on the offensive, but in other spots not so much.
Instead in other spots the drone operators have switched from hunting equipment that does not exist, to hunting soldiers in trenches, troop concentrations behind, and by blowing up troop transport vehicles.
We have in the last couple of months seen the amount of new Russian soldiers drop considerably from between 20-30K per month, down first to barely 20K, and now at around 15K.
This has happened even though Russia is going hard after foreign mercenaries, mostly from poor African countries.
We do not understand why Russia is not going for a second large mobifikation.
Supposedly they are still able to do that.
There is for one reason of another a huge indecisiveness in this regard inside Russia.
As far as we know Russia can perform one last big mobilisation at between 300 and 500K, but that would sort of be their last big hooray.
Why this is not happening is anyones guess.
We sort of want them to do this, currently it is the last big hurdle for us to overcome, and then peace would be there due to a permanent lack of Russian soldiers.
Obviously it would prolong the war, so we much more want Russia to go home, but wishes and horses and all that drivel...
Personally I suspect that they will do it in the end.
Go big before going home is after all a very Russian thing to do.
Offensive
This is supposedly the season of the mighty Russian summer offensive.
We saw it start alright, but it faltered fast due to lack of equipment and manpower.
Russia tried to pull out the length of the frontline to create cracks in the Ukrainian lines, but instead the exact opposite happened.
You only lengthen a frontline if you have the upper hand in manpower and equipment, and in that case it is done to get a quicker resolution to a war.
This leads me to believe that Russian leadership truly does not understand, nor know, how bad things really are for the Russian army.
Throwing generals into prison for telling the truth is truly coming back to bite Russia in the ass now.
Telling the truth is the cardinal sin that both Surovikin and Popov did, and after them the Russian generals seem to file the reports that the upper echelong long for, and they are not even nearly telling how bad it is.
Arms Industry
The Russian militaryindustrial complex have in large parts failed miserably in regards of producing at the rate needed, or even at all.
Tanks is a fine example, so far during the war Russia has failed to produce a single newbuild tank.
And even converting T72 hulls into T90M2 Proryv has stalled completely due to the lack of parts.
Instead they are now only able to produce a train set of repainted and repaired T62's, T55's and T54's.
And this is only possible by scavaging 3-5 rust buckets to make a single working tank.
Why do they not use newmake spareparts?
Because those factories are gone now, especially the motor-plant was a hard hit.
But, Russia only being able to produce 10 barrels per week, and that in competition with the artillery systems producers, is also creating huge problems.
Artillery is also underproduced since Russia in total is producing around 10 barrels per week.
And those barrels are divided between new artillery systems, replacement barrels and tanks.
And with previously dozens of those being blown up each day, the production was never nearly fast enough to make a real difference.
A years production of 500 barrels is after all less than 10 days of attrition, leaving 345 days of the year as negative posts in the inventory sheets.
So, what is Russia producing enough of?
Well, sort of Rifles, so far they have produced just about enough to not have to send unarmed soldiers to the front, even though it has happened due to local lack of equipment.
They also sort of produce enough uniforms.
What so far have been the star childs of Russian production are Orland and Shaheed drones.
Only problem is that the Shaheeds by now is a massive money dump for the Russians, with nearly zero of the launched "mopeds" arriving on target.
The Orlans are though functioning fairly well, and they are a bit of a nuisance.
Missiles is also something that Russia is producing faster than we expected.
Currently they are producing around 25-30 percent of what they need, and that should be seen as a success for Russia.
The reason here is that Russia has been very good at running around components sanctions, hence why EU and US tightened those sanctions last week to also include "sanction-runners" and "countries aiding".
We hope that this will drop the numbers of missiles produced down to around 10 percent of the Russian needs.
But, missiles and drones are by now the most prioritized items in the Russian military-industrial complex, so never expect it to reach zero.
There is though thankfully now a new option available.
Instead of shielding against arrows we are now able to kill the archer.
With the new Usage of Weapons Rules we can hunt the launch sites and launch equipment.
Next step is to take out more of the industrial base, hindering those "bows" to even be built.
The most crucial deficiency is though shell production.
Yes, Russia claims to produce 2 million shells per year, but they handily never specified what type of shells.
In reality and from what we can deduce from the "receiving end", Russia produces 1 million shells of all types from 120mm mortar shells and upwards.
Then we also have those weird numbers given on the deliveries of shells from North Korea.
I can't grasp where does come from, or yes I know where the figure of 5 million shells come from, but I can't understand how someone can be stupid enough to calculate that way.
If you would pack each container to bursting with shells only you would indeed reach 5 million shells.
But that does not include propellant charges, shell boxes, detonators, or any other aid that has been given so far.
If we take that into account we reach somewhere between 1 - 1.5 million shells.
A big number, but in the greater scale of things not nearly enough.
Especially if we should believe the Russian numbers of half of them being duds in one way or form, or just simply explode in the barrel.
That being said, putting together Russian shell production, North Korean shells, and Russian stores being found, Russia still has a per shell advantage of 2:1 in total.
I guess I do not have to reiterate the difference in accuracy and shot-range once more do I?
I am starting to feel like a parrot in this regard, I even have to explain this to NATO-colleagues on occasion, and they should dammit know that already.
Initiative
With the Russian offensives having faltered, Ukraine could rapidly grasp the initiative on the battlefield, and are now almost exclusively able to dictate what is happening, and perhaps even more crucially where it is happening.
Do note that failing an offensive does not necessarily necessitate loosing the initiative, at least as long as you have enough resources to chuck into the next offensive, and we all know that Russia from Bakhmut onwards have done offensive after offensive, almost ad absurdum.
For a long time there was an inevitability and relentlesness to the Russian offensives, and Russia firmly had the initiative everywhere but in Kherson.
And many of those offensives did result in Russian gains, albeit small and very costly.
Now those offensive have stalled out almost completely, and in only two places Russia even attempt to offend right now.
Those are Chasiv Yar, and down near Ocheretyne.
I would though at least for now, call those failed offensives judging from the results gained.
The transistion of initiative is oftentimes fast in a war.
Remember how relentless Ukraine looked during the advances in Kharkiv and Kherson, and how fast that shifted into Bakhmut and the slow troglodytic Russian meatwaves.
This time the shift was even faster, borne on a tide of Western Aid packages, and Ukrainian mass-mobilisation.
Question now is if Russia can wrestle back the initiative?
There are two clouds in the sky in this regard.
The first cloud is if they do a final massive mobifikation to prolong the war, that would theoretically give them the potential to take back the initiative and go back to their beloved meatwaves.
Problem here is that they are by now lacking equipment to really make it effective.
And, it would be a temporary thing in the end anyway.
The second cloud is filled with utter noncense and is dipped in orange colour.
In other words, the potential return of El Humpo the Orange Cheetoh.
If that happens the initiative would be likely to slide back into Russias favour, and the war would drag out for years, and necessitating that Europe goes to war to stop that from happening.
But, at the same time we should see the sun for what it is, something warm and comforting that brings bountiful harvests.
In this case I mean the processes going on to put a stopper in Kremlins collective piehole, something we all saw this weekend.
The sun is most likely coming to scare away the Russian vampires, or turn them into dust.
Initiative Effects
Russia is clearly now going into a more defensive posture, we see this in the attempts to save on tanks and other equipment, and I think we will see this trend continue.
But, Russia is Russia, so I expect that meatwaves will continue, at least to some capacity.
Yes, we can beat our chests and claim that it is all our making, and that we are so successful at breaking Russian offensives, and even going on our own offensives, that Russia has been forced into a more defensive posture.
But, that is only half the truth, Russia could have continued to go on the offensive still.
For reasons not known to us they did chose to discontinue, or limit, their offensives, and go into a more defensive posture.
Yes, we have seen peak Russia, that is clear.
But the scale of things, and the scale of Russias resources, are such that they still have the ability to offend if they wish.
So, we should not kid ourselves and believe that from now on all is sunshine.
At the same time we do see signs that Russia now is truly worried, or is planning to cut down the length of the frontline.
We see this at Crimea.
At Crimea Russia is holding troops, artillery, consumables, air defence (well sort of), and other things needed for the war effort in other locations.
So, theoretically they could move all of that into the frontline sections and strengthen those since Crimea technically is not a frontline section even though it is under bombardment.
Problem is though for Russia that this would invite a bunch of very happy Ukrainians liberating away with gusto in Crimea.
Still we see signs of Russia clearly planning to withdraw all those resources.
First we saw them giving up on air defence, even though they did send in 1 their only S-500 prototype, but that will most likely not do any difference since everything else was moved out, including the men manning the Russian AD.
Second sign is the issuing of the order to loot the museums of any valuables, same as we saw in Northern Kherson.
Either Russia is planning to gamble against Ukraine being able to attack Crimea, even if left unguarded or lightly guarded.
Or, they have made a hard decission to pull out of Crimea in favour of Donetsk and Luhansk.
If it is the latter they will have to give up Kherson too, and keeping the landbridge would also be pretty stupid at that point.
This would literally double the available amount of soldiers and equipment in Donetsk and Luhansk, while at the same time not truly doubling the Ukrainian numbers.
This due to Ukraine not having any corresponding troops in Crimea.
Another point about Russia going into a defensive stance is that they might be considering giving up alltogether before the uncoming storm of being forced out of Ukraine, either by Ukraine on their own, or by Ukraine aided by an alliance army.
I at least for now do not count on this, Russia is just to stupid and to stubborn for this.
No, I believe that Russia is handing over initiative and going into defense as a plan to hunker down through the US elections in the hope that their candidate will win, and that they after that can perform a final large mobilisation and then charge ahead across Ukraine.
If that dream of theirs come through all support for Ukraine will slam shut on the 20th of January, and on the same date the US would leave NATO.
Problem is that I am not sure any longer that it would even matter.
The packages coming are so big by now that it would leave Ukraine with a large surplus on that date, or able to go on a massive offensive of their own prior.
The Russians are also so weakened by now that it is not even certain that the US would be needed at that point in time.
And, in the end the remaining alliance would at that point be forced to go in to get a quick decissive victory over Russia.
But, I for the sake of everyone I hope that Russia's Orange Dream does not come into fruition.
Anyway, I think that this is why they are starting to hunker down.
But, there is also the small chance that this is due Russia contemplating attempting to negotiate in the peace process, stating that they can be stubborn and go on the defencive, forcing the Alliance to intervene, or they could get some small things our of the negotiations.
If so I think that they would negotiate the hardest on Hague, secondly on sanctions, and thirdly on reparations, and only fourth on keeping land areas.
The next 5 months will be deciding, both in regards of the outcome of the war from a military standpoint, but also from a political standpoint.
One thing I am sure of though, if El Humpo the Orange Cheetoh looses the election, then Russia will give up."